The existing tax policies towards gasoline and diesel cars in European countries provide a unique opportunity to analyze quality-based price discrimination and the implied tax incidence. We develop an econometric framework for the demand and pricing of gasoline and diesel cars. Consumers choose the type of engine based on their annual mileage; prices are set by the manufacturers. Our empirical results
Introduction
Price discrimination based on willingness to pay for quality has been studied extensively in the theoretical literature. Mussa and Rosen (1978) show how a monopolist can extract higher pro¯t margins from consumers with a higher willingness to pay for quality by o®ering a wide product line of price-quality combinations.
When several¯rms compete, the feasibility and the nature of quality-based price discrimination is less well understood. It depends on the precise pattern of competitive interaction, and no general results are available.
1 At the same time, e®orts to quantify the empirical importance of price discriminating practices have been limited. The problem is, of course, that the observed price di®erentials between high and low quality variants may stem from either cost or markup di®erences.
In the European car market a unique opportunity is available to empirically analyze quality-based price discrimination. In most European countries, cars are sold under two types of engine: the gasoline and the diesel engine. The diesel engine has a higher \quality" in the sense that it consumes less fuel per mile and requires less expensive fuel due to a favorable tax treatment. Consumers di®er in their willingnes to pay for this quality aspect since they are heterogeneous in their annual mileage. As a result, manufacturers may consider a price discriminating strategy by charging di®erent pro¯t markups on the gasoline and the diesel variants to exploit the consumer mileage heterogeneity.
We develop an econometric model of demand and pricing for gasoline and diesel cars. The demand model allows consumers to be heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the fuel cost per mile, while restricting consumers to be homogeneous in their valuation for other quality di®erences between gasoline and diesel engines. The model predicts average mileages for gasoline and diesel consumers that are consistent with prior information. In particular, the average mileages of gasoline consumers are substantially below those of diesel consumers. The dominant engine characteristic for which consumer have heterogeneous preferences therefore appears to be the fuel cost per mile. Preferences for the other engine characteristics appear to be reasonably homogeneous as a¯rst approximation.
The pricing model investigates whether¯rms exploit this preference heterogeneity for fuel costs by charging higher markups on diesel cars. The observed price di®erentials between gasoline and diesel cars are decomposed into their cost and markup components. The estimates demonstrate that the price di®erentials are best explained by price discrimination of a monopolistic type. On average, about 75 to 90 percent of the price premium to be paid for a diesel car can be attributed to price discrimination between high and low mileage consumers; the remaining part follows from higher costs due to di®erences in engine speci¯cations.
These results empirically demonstrate the feasibility and the importance of quality-based price discrimination in the presence of competition. The results have implications for the e®ectiveness of fuel tax and car 1 See, for example, the speci¯c assumptions on brand preferences used in Katz (1984) to model product di®erentiation and competitive interaction. Gilbert and Matutes (1993) use a di®erent model of brand preferences, and¯nd, surprisingly, that competition eliminates the feasibility of quality-based price discrimination.
tax policy. For example, the estimated demand e®ect of an increase in the diesel fuel tax is reduced by 50 percent if one accounts for monopolistic price responses to tax changes; the revenue e®ects are also a®ected, but to a lesser extent.
As noted above, there exists very little econometric evidence on quality-based price discrimination. Shepard (1991) analyzes a market where¯rms di®er in their ability to price discriminate, but presumably not (much) in their cost of production. Observed di®erences between¯rms in price di®erentials may then be attributed to markups, i.e. price discrimination.
2 Unlike Shepard's application, we have no prior information on costs. We instead infer the presence of price discrimination from the structural model of conduct that is found to best¯t the data. Leslie (1999) considers various types of price discrimination for a Broadway play, including price discrimination based on di®erent seat qualities. He starts by estimating the demand system, and computes the prices as predicted by the current industry circumstances. He then investigates how prices would change if the¯rm had more°exibility in setting the price menu. 3
Research on demand and pricing in the automobile market has received considerable attention in recent years. Most contributions ignore the issue of quality-based price discrimination by limiting attention to base model cars. The focus is instead on the nature of product di®erentiation and competition between di®erent car models. See the contributions by Bresnahan (1981 Bresnahan ( , 1987 , Pakes (1995, 1999) , Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995) , Goldberg (1995) , Petrin (1999) and Sudhir (2001) for the U.S. market.
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Regarding the European car market, Verboven (1996) and Goldberg and Verboven (2001) provide evidence of international price discrimination. This is price discrimination of the third degree, and is achieved by the manufacturers' strategies to prevent cross-border consumer (or parallel importer) trade. The present paper may be seen as reinforcing the evidence that¯rms in a seemingly competitive market succeed in price discrimination strategies, also of the second degree type, by pro¯tably segmenting consumers with a low annual mileage from those with a high annual mileage.
There exists very detailed econometric evidence on price elasticities of demand for fuel. Goodwin (1992) and Oum, Waters and Yong (1992) provide a survey of this literature. The considerable amount of empirical research can be explained by the strong interest from a public policy taxation perspective. A distinction 2 In particular, Shepard (1991) considers price di®erentials between full-service and self-service at gasoline stations. She compares these di®erentials between stations o®ering both types and stations o®ering only one type of service. Assuming that there is no di®erence in the cost of o®ering these services combined rather than separately, one may attribute higher price di®erentials at multi-service stations to price discrimination. Cohen (2001) adopts similar types of reduced form tests in the market for paper towels.
3 Metrick and Zeckhauser (1996) also consider the relationship between prices and quality (as well as quantity), in a theoretical and empirical analysis. In their application, di®erent¯rms sell di®erent qualities, and the question is whether prices will di®er between these di®erentiated¯rms (or whether instead sales will di®er). In our paper, the same¯rm o®ers di®erent qualities (gasoline versus diesel), a central question being whether that¯rm can use its di®erent qualities to price discriminate. 4 Among these product di®erentiation studies, Bresnahan (1987) , Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999) consider the nature of competition.
is usually made between short-term and long-term fuel price elasticities. Short-term elasticities measure fuel demand e®ects keeping the vehicle stock¯xed; long-term elasticities take into account changes in the size and the structure of the vehicle stock in response to fuel price changes. 5 A robust¯nding is that the long-term fuel price elasticities are substantially higher than the short-term elasticities. The results of the present paper imply that the long-term fuel price elasticities may be overestimated if one does not properly account for the observed tax incidence by the car manufacturers in response to fuel price changes.
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The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the market for gasoline and diesel cars in three European countries: Belgium, France and Italy. Section 3 introduces the econometric model of gasoline/diesel demand and pricing. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
The market for gasoline and diesel cars in Europe
The vast majority of automobile engines in Europe are fuelled with either gasoline or diesel petroleum.
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Automobiles with a diesel engine quickly gained popularity in Europe during the seventies, stimulated by a favourable tax treatment and the subsequent technological improvements. In recent years, the choice between a gasoline or a diesel car has become one of the key elements in the European consumer's car purchasing decision.
To introduce the questions we address in this paper, we have a¯rst look at the technology, taxation, pricing and demand. This discussion will be based on the data set we collected for three European countries, which is summarized in Table 1A and 1B. The data consist of sales, list prices, taxes and technical characteristics of 41 pairs of automobile models in Belgium, France and Italy during 1991-1994 . These data are supplemented with information on the distribution of annual car mileage. 8 The included models are the 5 The long-term changes in the size and structure of the vehicle stock may follow from both changed car purchasing decisions and from new model introductions. Pakes et al. (1993) provide convincing evidence (partly based on patent data for combustion engines) that companies in the U.S. started to develop more fuel e±cient cars in response to the rise in fuel prices in 1973; the development of reliable diesel cars in Europe during the 70s and 80s has also been a response to fuel prices, as seen below. In our econometric analysis we nevertheless take the product characteristics as given. The long term elasticities then essentially di®er from the short term elasticities because of changed car purchasing decisions, in particular the substitution to diesel engines with a lower cost per mile. 6 Issues of tax incidence are also present in Fershtman, Gandal and Markovich' (1998) empirical study of the Israeli car market, with an instructive policy simulation analysis of alternative taxes. They only consider car taxes, and do not look at taxes in related complementary markets, such as fuel taxes. Furthermore, their empirical estimates do not establish that¯rms indeed take into account taxes in their pricing strategies; the extent of tax incidence is driven by their assumption of Bertrand pricing behavior. 7 There is a third possible fuel: liquid patrol gas (LPG). However, the market share of automobiles with an LPG engine is quite small, and in fact negligable in the three European countries that we study in detail. 8 Data on list prices (including value added taxes) and technical characteristics come from the following weekly retail catalogues (August issue) De Autogids (Belgium), l'Automobile Magazine (France), Quattroruote (Italy). Sales data come from publications on new car registrations by the Nationaal Instituut voor Statistiek (Belgium), l'Argus de l'Automobile et Locomo-base models from the gasoline and the diesel range. In cases where the base model of a gasoline variant was equipped with a di®erent set of options than the diesel variant (e.g. air conditioner or ABS), we appropriately upgraded or downgraded the variants such that they contain the same equipment. 9 Table 1A shows summary statistics for the separate gasoline and diesel variables. Table 1B shows more detailed summary statistics for the di®erences between the diesel and gasoline variables, which are the actual variables entering in the empirical model. The \between" standard deviation measures the variation across models, whereas the \within" standard deviation is a measure of the variation across the three countries. The standard deviations show that the technical characteristics especially show variation across models; the tax variables (fuel and car tax) mainly show variation across countries; and the initial purchase price and sales variables show important variation over both dimensions.
Technology
In a gasoline engine, a mixture of air and fuel is ignited by a spark; in a diesel engine, the mixture explodes spontaneously due to the high pressure. These technical di®erences lie at the basis of some wellknown di®erences in performance and comfort. The diesel engine traditionally produced lower horsepower (at equal engine size), and lower speed and acceleration than the gasoline engine. Furthermore, the diesel engine has a reputation of making more noise and of a less reliable start under cold temperatures. On the positive side, a diesel engine generally has a greater fuel e±ciency yielding a greater \autonomy" (the number of miles that can be driven with a full tank). Diesel engines also have a longer durability than their gasoline counterparts.
Due to technological improvements (such as the introduction of the turbo and direct injection), these di®erences have diminished in recent years. Manufacturers in fact spend signi¯cant e®orts to o®er closely comparable \twin models": for each model, they typically o®er about 4 to 6 di®erent versions of gasoline engines, and a similar number of diesel engines. The averages in Table 1A and 1B give an idea of the current di®erences in technical characteristics. The lower engine power of diesel cars (horsepower, speed, acceleration time) is compensated by the higher engine capacity (displacement) and a higher weight (partly due to a stronger insulation against the diesel noise). Greater diesel fuel e±ciency is re°ected in the lower amount of liter consumed per 100 km.
Taxation
It is hard to overstate the importance of taxes on automobiles in Europe. In France and Belgium, automobile-related tax revenues respectively amounted to about 800 and 1000 dollars per capita in 1997. In other European countries, similar amounts apply. The most important taxes are value added taxes on the 9 Helpful and competent research assistance in this tedious data collection process was provided by Sandy Torrekens.
purchase of a (new or second-hand) car, annual car taxes, and excise taxes on fuel. The annual car taxes and the fuel taxes have been designed to follow a discriminatory policy towards gasoline and diesel cars.
Furthermore, di®erent countries typically adopted di®erent policies. which are based on the¯scal horsepower assigned to a car. In France, the annual car taxes also favor diesel cars. In Belgium but especially in Italy, the annual car taxes on diesel cars are higher than on gasoline cars.
In Italy, the higher annual car taxes even outweigh the savings in fuel costs from driving a diesel, at least for the average Italian driver.
The policy reasons behind the di®erential tax treatment towards gasoline and diesel cars are not obvious.
According to the OECD (1993, p. 210) , the favorable tax treatment on the diesel fuel \is intended to avoid disabling freight transport, but governments also see some value in the introduction of diesel cars".
For example, the OECD attributes the particularly favorable attitude towards diesel cars in France to the strength of French manufacturers in exporting diesel cars and supplying engines to other manufacturers; it also re°ects a more general concern in French energy policy to minimize oil dependence (since diesel cars consume less). From an environmental perspective, the favorable diesel tax treatment does not seem justi¯ed. As discussed for example in Michaelis (1995) , the diesel engine emits less carbon monoxide than the (unleaded) gasoline engine, roughly the same volatile organic compounds, and more NO x . In addition, it emits airborne particulates unlike the gasoline engine. The net result of these di®erent emissions is that diesel cars are not clearly less damaging from an environmental (e.g. global warming) point of view, whereas they do have some clear disadvantages from the point of view of urban air quality (Crawford and Smith, 1995 Another way to verify whether the car prices re°ect the tax policies is by considering a simple reduced form regression. Table 3 regresses the car price di®erential between diesel and gasoline cars on di®erences in observed technical characteristics and on the di®erences in average annual fuel cost and car tax di®erentials. 14 In the¯rst speci¯cation (column 1) the fuel cost and annual car tax di®erential enter linearly. The estimates show that a¯rm raises the price premium for a diesel car by $6.34 in response to an additional annual fuel cost saving of $1 from purchasing of a diesel car. Firms do not appear to signi¯cantly change their diesel price premium in response to a change in the annual car tax di®erence. In the second speci¯cation (column 2 of Table 3 ) the square of fuel cost and annual car tax also enter, to allow for a nonlinear relationship.
11 For example, for a large set of cars consumer magazine Test-Achats (1995, nr. 373) even computed the critical mileages above which the diesel variant becomes more advantageous than the gasoline variant. 13 This remains true after adjusting for di®erences in observed quality. This was veri¯ed in a hedonic regression from which quality-adjusted price di®erences may be computed. 14 These regressions resemble standard \hedonic regressions", except that now prices are expressed in di®erences between diesel and gasoline cars, hence the lower R 2 . The regressions should only be interpreted as preliminary evidence, since they contain a mixture of both suply side and demand side considerations.
Additional annual fuel cost savings on diesel cars again lead to higher diesel price premia, though the e®ect is declining; at an average annual fuel cost saving of $456, a¯rm would raise the diesel price premium by $10.17 in response to an additional annual fuel cost saving by $1. A decrease in the annual car tax di®erence would lead to an increase in the diesel price premium by $3.09 at a zero tax di®erence, but only to an insigni¯cant $1.92 increase evaluate at the average car tax di®erence of $112. Overall, these regressions suggest that¯rms substantially adjust the diesel price premium in response to fuel cost di®erentials, but less so in response to car tax di®erentials.
The above discussion gave some descriptive evidence on how tax policies may in°uence both consumer demand and manufacturer pricing behavior. This is now formalized in a model to explain price di®erentials, and decompose them into marginal cost and markup di®erences.
3 Consumer demand
The model
Consumers choose to purchase one particular car make j coming with one of two engine variants k, where k = G; D refers to the gasoline or the diesel engine. The utility derived from purchasing one particular make/engine variant takes the following simple form
where a j k is the mean intrinsic utility from purchasing make j with engine k, common to all consumers; º j is an individual-speci¯c random component around that mean; and z is the consumption of goods other than car services. Both the mean utility term a j k and the individual-speci¯c term º j may depend on observable characteristics such as performance, size and safety. The term º j is often modelled as an i.i.d. random variable (as in the logit model), implying no correlation of consumer preferences across cars. Advances in the discrete choice literature, most notably by Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) , show how to relax this unrealistic assumption and allow consumer preferences to be correlated across cars with similar characteristics. Their random coe±cients speci¯cation of º j yields a°exible aggregate model of product di®erentiation, with plausible substitution patterns between di®erent cars. For recent applications see, for example, Nevo (2001) and Petrin (1999) . As shown below, in our application no speci¯c structure is imposed on º j . We focus instead on the choice of engine, conditional on the car choice.
Consumers have an annual income y to be spent on car services and other goods z. Annual expenditures on car services include the following three terms: an annualized initial purchase price, annual car taxes and annual fuel expenditures.
(i) The purchase price of a car is p j k . This is written in annualized terms as ½p j k , where ½ is an annualization coe±cient, depending on the consumer's rate of time preference (or implicit interest rate) and the expected vehicle life. 15 The coe±cient ½ is to be estimated from the data, and is expected to lie between 0 and 1. When consumers have a high implicit interest rate or when the expected vehicle life is low, ½ is close to one and the purchase price of a car is quickly discounted. Conversely, when consumers have a low implicit interest rate, ½ is close to zero.
(ii) In addition to the annualized purchase price ½p j k , the consumers also need to pay an annual car tax of ¿ j k . This tax may di®er across makes and variants, and is usually based on the \¯scal horsepower" of a car. The¯scal horsepower is computed from characteristics such as horsepower, displacement and weight according to a formula de¯ned by the government.
(iii) Finally, consumers incur annual fuel expenditures. These depend on the fuel price q k for fuel k (i.e. gasoline or diesel fuel, in dollars per liter), on the fuel e±ciency w j k (in liters per 100 kilometer), and on the annual mileage µ. Annual fuel expenditures per mile are
The annual mileage µ is a random variable which may vary from consumer to consumer. For simplicity, assume that annual mileage is not sensitive to fuel prices (inelastic demand), so that a consumer's total annual fuel expenditures equal ¼ j k µ.
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In sum, when purchasing a particular make j with engine k, total annual expenditures on car services are given by
other goods z (at a price normalized to 1). We can then write a consumer's indirect utility from purchasing a make j with engine k as
Given this indirect utility function, consumers can choose their most preferred make and engine variant.
For our purposes it is su±cient to focus on the consumer's choice of engine variant k conditional on purchasing a particular make j. This choice crucially depends on the consumer's annual mileage µ. A consumer is indi®erent between buying make j with a gasoline engine G and with a diesel engine
if her annual mileage equals
where the ¢x j denotes the di®erence between a diesel and a gasoline variable, i.e. ¢x j´x j D ¡ x j G .
Consumers driving µ < µ ¤ j prefer the gasoline engine of j; other consumers prefer the diesel engine of j. One 15 Following Hausman (1978) , one may de¯ne the annualization coe±cient as ½ = (r=(1 + r)
, where r is the rate of time preference (implicit interest rate) and T is the vehicle life. From the estimate of ½ and information on T one can then infer the implicit interest rate r. 16 Previous studies have estimated quite low \short-term" elasticities of gasoline demand, varying from 0 to around ¡:2. See for example Goldberg (1998) for a discussion.
can then compute the probability that the gasoline variant is chosen, conditional upon buying j , and equate this to the observed market share of the gasoline variant of j in the total sales of j, s Gjj , i.e.
where F j (¢) is the conditional cumulative distribution function of µ, i.e. conditional on the choice of car j. This distribution may di®er across car makes j. For example, it is empirically observed that consumers who decide to purchase larger cars also tend to drive more miles per year. Since the cumulative distribution function F j (¢) is a monotone increasing function, we can invert (3) such that µ
. Rearrange this using (2) to obtain:
where
is a monotone function de¯ned as the inverse of F j (¢). Equation (4) is the transformed conditional demand equation. Before discussing its empirical speci¯cation, several remarks are in order.
First, note that the random variable º j does not appear in (4). In this sense our approach is distinct from the work of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and the subsequent literature. They focus on understanding the pattern of product di®erentiation between di®erent cars, by explicitly modelling º j in a random coe±cients framework. Our approach abstracts from the product di®erentiation aspects between cars, and instead focuses on understanding the choice of the engine variant, conditional on the choice of a car make, without specifying the distribution of º j .
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Second, note that annual mileage is the only source of consumer heterogeneity a®ecting the conditional gasoline{diesel choice. The consumers' annual mileage matters since it is interacted with the fuel expenditures per mile ¼ j k associated with engine variant k of car j. In practice, consumers may also be heterogeneous in their valuation of other engine characteristics, such as horsepower. To account for such heterogeneity, one could specify an unconditional market share equation, and obtain identi¯cation of the random coe±cients as in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) . Instead, we chose to start with the conditional market share equation and account for annual mileage as the main source of heterogeneity. To obtain an idea of the plausibility of this speci¯cation, we will compute the predicted average mileages, distinguished by gasoline and diesel consumers, and confront these with the available prior evidence on annual gasoline and diesel mileages. If annual mileage is indeed the most important source of consumer heterogeneity a®ecting the gasoline{diesel 17 It is also instructive to make a comparison with Bresnahan (1981 Bresnahan ( , 1987 , who made early contributions to measuring product di®erentiation and market power. He formulated a model of one-dimensional vertical product di®erentiation (with quality proxied by a combination of horsepower, car size, etc...). In our empirical model, there is also a single quality dimension (namely fuel expenditures per mile). However, Bresnahan's one-dimensional vertical di®erentiation model is used to describe product di®erentiation between di®erent cars. In contrast, our model only describes di®erentiation between di®erent engine variants, given the car choice (while di®erentiation across cars is allowed to be more general).
choice, one can expect the predicted mileages for gasoline users to be substantially below the predicted mileages for diesel users, in line with the actually observed mileages. In contrast, if there are important other sources of heterogeneity, one may expect the actual mileages for gasoline and diesel users to be closer to each other than predicted by the demand model.
Speci¯cation
To estimate the demand, we use product-level data on aggregate sales, prices and characteristics, plus data on the mileage distribution. To complete the demand speci¯cation, we need to specify F ¡1 j (¢) and ¢a j in (4). First consider F ¡1 j (¢), which is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function of mileage for consumers purchasing j. One can therefore interpret F ¡1 j (s G jj ) as a threshold mileage, i.e. the mileage that is not reached during one year by a given proportion s Gjj of consumers purchasing j . In principle, this information can be obtained from consumer survey tables containing, for each make, one column with annual mileage categories and a second column with the proportion of cars corresponding to each mileage category; there is thus no need for making parametric assumptions on the distribution function of µ. In practice, we do not have such a detailed information on mileage distribution at our disposal for the three countries. We therefore specify the cumulative distribution function of µ, and its corresponding inverse, parametrically as a parsimonious function of two parameters, the mean annual mileage ¹ j and the standard deviation ¾ j .
These parameters are not observed for every make j. Instead, we have information on these parameters for several weight or horsepower categories. Speci¯cally, we match each car j to its appropriate weight category, and assign the corresponding mileage information to it. The empirical results are very similar when the horsepower categories are used.
Given our parametric approach for the distribution of mileage it is important to examine the robustness of the results with respect to alternative functional forms. We considered three alternatives: the double exponential (which resembles the bell shape of the normal distribution), a two-parameter exponential (which is a skewed distribution function) and the uniform. The results are essentially robust with respect to these alternative specifcations. We report here only the results using the double exponential distribution. Applying (3), the market share equation s G jj = F j (µ ¤ j ) is then given:
where ¼ ¼ 3:14 and°¼ :577 is Euler's constant. It is straightforward to rearrange this equation to obtain a solution for µ
. This solution can then be substituted into the transformed demand equation (4). Now consider ¢a j . Recall that ¢a j captures the di®erence in the mean intrinsic utility from purchasing make j with a diesel engine (a j D ) or with a gasoline engine (a j G ). Note that the variables measuring size and safety are common to the gasoline and diesel variants of a make j, so that they do not enter ¢a j . Hence only the performance variables, such as horsepower, displacement, speed and acceleration, enter ¢a j . More precisely, we specify ¢a j as follows:
where ¢P ERF j captures di®erences in observed performance variables, for example di®erences in horsepower. The constant ® 0 can be interpreted as the mean extra utility from a diesel variant, possibly negative.
It captures speci¯c diesel features that are not measured by the performance variables in ¢P ERF j , such as discomfort from noise, unreliability or longer durability. Finally, the term " j is a mean zero i.i.d. error
term. It captures diesel features speci¯c to make j that in°uence utility, but that are unobserved by the econometrician. For example, it is possible that a Renault 19 has a diesel engine with an above average reliability, whereas Volkswagen Polo has one below average.
To summarize, substituting the expression for ¢a j , (6), in equation (4), and rearranging we obtain the following demand speci¯cation that can be taken to the data:
where F ¡1 j (s G jj ) can be computed from inverting the distribution function given by (5). The parameters to be estimated are ® 0 , ® 1 and ½. The required data are sales, prices, technical characteristics, and the mileage distribution across consumers.
Pricing
Because of our interest in the implications for price discrimination and tax incidence, we also specify two stylized models of pricing. As in the speci¯cation of the demand side, we are not interested in a complete analysis of pricing. Instead, we focus on explaining price di®erentials between diesel and gasoline cars.
Generally speaking, the price di®erential ¢p j can be decomposed in a marginal cost di®erence ¢c j and a markup di®erence ¢m j , i.e.:
¢p j = ¢c j + ¢m j A¯rst model states that there are no markup di®erences, ¢m j = 0. The price di®erential between diesel and gasoline cars is then entirely driven by di®erences in the marginal cost of producing diesel and gasoline cars. A purely cost-driven explanation for price di®erentials would obviously obtain under perfect competition. However, price di®erentials will also be cost-driven under imperfect competition if¯rms charge the same markup for their gasoline and diesel cars. Several theoretical models of oligopoly pricing in fact yield zero markup di®erences between high and low quality products of the same¯rm, see e.g. Gilbert and Matutes (1993) and Armstrong and Vickers (2001) . 1 8
An alternative model states that the markup di®erences between diesel and gasoline cars are equal to the premium charged under monopoly market power. Since we are only interested in the markup di®erences, we only need to model the pricing for the diesel cars relative to the pricing for the gasoline cars. Speci¯cally, consider a monopolist for car j, setting the price of its diesel variant p j D to maximize the sum of its gasoline and diesel pro¯ts, given that consumers do not substitute to other cars:
¢ is the conditional market share equation as given by (3). The optimal price p j D satis¯es the¯rst-order condition:
where f j (¢) is the density function of F j (¢). This can be rewritten as:
A monopoly price surcharge for a diesel car would naturally result if the¯rms have local monopoly power for each make j.
19 Yet note that to obtain the above expression for price di®erentials it is su±cient to assume that the prices of the diesel variants, p j D , are set monopolistically, relative to the prices for the gasoline variants. This thus allows for the possibility that the price levels of base gasoline variants are set quite competitively.
Analogous to the speci¯cation of the mean utility di®erence between a gasoline and a diesel car, ¢a j , we specify the marginal cost di®erence ¢c j as follows:
The same characteristics that in°uence the di®erences in the mean utility may thus also a®ect di®erences in marginal costs.
To summarize, using (9) we have two possible pricing speci¯cations, which we will refer to below as our \competitive" and \monopolistic" pricing speci¯cations:
18 Gilbert and Matutes (1993) show this in an oligopoly with two price setting¯rms, each¯rm selling a high quality and a low quality variant of horizontally di®erentiated products. Armstrong and Vickers (2001) obtain a more general result in the context of nonlinear pricing. See their Proposition 5, and also Proposition 2 in Rochet and Stole (2002) and Proposition 1 in Verboven (1999).
19 Specify, for example, for each make j the individual-speci¯c taste parameter º j to equal 0 for a fraction ' j of consumers, and equal to ¡1 for the remaining fraction. For each car make j there is then local monopoly power over a fraction ' j consumers.
\competitive" :
One should keep in mind that these terms only serve to label the pattern of observed price di®erentials between gasoline and diesel variants. They do not necessarily refer to the manufacturers' actual pricing behavior for all prices in the market.
Identi¯cation and estimation
In the empirical analysis we begin by estimating the demand equation (7) separately, without imposing any structure on pricing behavior. Next, we estimate the demand equation (7) jointly with the pricing equation (10). Whether or not one estimates the equations simultaneously, it is important account for the fact that s Gj j and ¢p j are endogenous variables, simultaneously determined by consumer demand and manufacturer pricing. Consequently, one may expect these variables to be correlated to the error terms " j and´j , which capture the unobserved diesel features of model j, in°uencing utility and marginal cost. For example, a diesel variant of a car j with a particularly high unobserved diesel quality " j will have a high market share, but at the same time the manufacturers will presumably charge a high price. The result is a positive correlation between ¢p j and " j . A simple ordinary least squares estimator would therefore be inconsistent; in particular, ½ would be biased towards zero. Consequently, instrumental variables should be used to obtain consistent parameter estimates. More speci¯cally, we adopt Hansen's (1982) generalized method of moments (GMM).
This estimator can be used for estimating a single equation or a simultaneous system with possibly correlated error terms " j and´j . The estimator allows one to compute heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that are robust with respect to serial correlation.
It remains to specify the set of instruments, which constitute the orthogonality conditions of the GMM estimator. The instruments should be exogenous variables, uncorrelated to the error term. Our main identi¯cation assumption is that the nonprice characteristics of the cars, such as performance, fuel e±ciency or taxes, qualify as such variables. This is a common assumption made in the empirical literature on oligopoly models with product di®erentiation. The usual justi¯cation for this assumption is that these are variables that can only be slowly adjusted, so that they may be viewed as predetermined at the pricing stage. The typical di±culty in adopting this approach is that these variables may enter both the demand and supply (cost) side, so that there may not be a su±cient number of instruments for the number of parameters to be estimated. Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) discuss this problem and propose to use (functions of) the characteristics of the competitors as additional instruments. In our application, the parameter restrictions that are implicit in speci¯cation (7) provide another answer to the suitable choice of instruments. In particular, ¢¼ j and ¢¿ j have no parameters to be estimated, so that these variables can be used as instruments for ¢p j . Economically, this identi¯cation follows from the fact that fuel costs and taxes are monetary variables that in°uence the consumers' budget constraint and indirect utility in the same manner as prices. Put di®erently, consumers care only about the total dollar amount they have to spend on car services, and not about whether this amount is spent on the car itself or on related taxes. 20 In sum, using ¢P ERF j , ¢¼ j and ¢¿ j , we have one more instrument than the number of parameters to be estimated.
The empirical results
As described in more detail in section 2, our data set contains sales, list prices and technical characteristics of 41 pairs of automobile models in three European countries, Belgium, France and Italy, during 1991-1994, plus data on the distribution of mileage across consumers. In the discussion below the subscript j should now be viewed as indexing the car make, country and year (instead of only the car make). To estimate (7) and (10), we need to specify the technical characteristics entering in ¢P ERF j . We have data on the following performance variables: horsepower, displacement, weight, speed and acceleration. We experimented with several alternative speci¯cations. The empirical results presented in Tables 4 to 6 are based on a speci¯cation including the horsepower, displacement, and weight. The parameter estimates, and the implications for the decomposition of price di®erentials into cost and markup di®erences, and for tax incidence, were robust when other characteristics were included. For example, we considered a speci¯cation with the horsepower/weight ratio and displacement as characteristics. We also considered a speci¯cation in which speed and acceleration enter instead of horsepower and displacement; and a speci¯cation in which horsepower, displacement, weight, speed and acceleration all enter together.
We impose some further structure on the error terms " j and´j through¯xed e®ects. We include market dummies for France and Italy to capture possible di®erences in tastes and costs, relative to the reference country Belgium. We cannot a priori rule out the possibility that French and Italian consumers have di®erent tastes for gasoline versus diesel cars than Belgian consumers. Signi¯cant cost di®erences across markets, in contrast, seem rather unlikely: there is no reason to expect a systematically higher cost of selling a diesel car in the French market than in the Belgian or Italian market. Insigni¯cant estimates for the market dummies on the cost side may thus be expected if the econometric model is well speci¯ed. We also include source country dummies for French, German or Italian cars to capture taste and cost di®erences across source countries. The reference is \other countries", i.e. Japan, Spain or the United Kingdom.
Demand
We start by estimating the demand equation separately. Column 1 of Table 4 shows the results. The parameters of the technical characteristics (® 1 ), which refer to the mean valuations, have the expected positive sign. For displacement and weight they are signi¯cant. Since diesel cars on average have a lower horsepower, but a higher weight and displacement than gasoline cars, it is interesting to look at the overall mean valuation di®erences implied by the estimates (¢a j ). It turns out that ¢a j is small on average, namely ¡291$ (written in capitalized terms), compared to an average purchase price di®erential of 2323$ (Table 1B) .
This con¯rms the discussion in section 2:¯rms are relatively succesful in o®ering \twin" gasoline and diesel cars, which are comparable in overall performance even if the individual characteristics di®er because of technological constraints.
The price coe±cient (½) is estimated very precisely at 0:121. Recall that ½ may be interpreted as an annualization coe±cient, re°ecting the extent to which consumers take into account the purchase price of the car in their annual budget constraint. Assuming a vehicle life of 11 years, the consumers' implicit interest rate implied by the estimate of ½ is about 11:5 percent. This is slightly above (though not signi¯cantly di®erent from) the actual interest rates on the capital markets during the period 1991-1994. For example, the 5 year government bond interest rate varied between 7.5 and 10 percent, whereas the interest rates on installment loans speci¯cally for purchasing cars varied between 9 and 11.7 percent in Belgium. The demand intercept is estimated to be ¡325:9 and signi¯cant: this says that Belgian consumers (the reference market) value diesel cars over 300 dollar less than a gasoline car, after controlling for the observed di®erences in characteristics; this may be due to, for example, discomfort from noise or lower reliability.
This negative diesel valuation is somewhat stronger in France (¡50 dollar); in Italy, consumers seem to care less about diesel comfort per se (signi¯cant¯xed e®ect of about +150 dollar). The dummy variables for the source countries are all insigni¯cant, implying that the French, German and Italian diesel brands do not have a signi¯cantly higher valuation than the brands from other origins.
21 This rate concerns a value of an installement loan of BEF 400000, or about $10000, with¯xed monthly installments during 48 months (information provided by consumer magazine Test-Achats). 22 This is consistent with economic theory, but con°icts with some anomalies in the literature. For example, Hausman (1979) nds econometric evidence that consumers use too high interest rates when choosing among airconditioners. Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) report experimental evidence on myopic consumer behavior. An explanation for the result that consumers use the \right" implicit interest rate is that there are good¯nancing possibilities for cars, and that the gasoline/diesel choice is a fairly clean investment problem, since every car typically o®ers both engine versions.
What does the demand speci¯cation predict about the annual mileage driven by consumers of gasoline and diesel cars? An answer to this question can provide an idea of how well the demand model is speci¯ed.
As discussed above, if the sole source of heterogeneity regarding the gasoline/diesel decision is the consumers' annual mileage, then one would expect the average annual mileage of gasoline consumers to be considerably lower than the average annual mileage of diesel consumers. In contrast, if there are other important sources of consumer heterogeneity, uncorrelated with mileage, then one would expect the average annual mileage of gasoline and diesel consumers to be closer to each other than predicted by the demand speci¯cation.
To address this question, we use data on the actual average mileages, distinguished by gasoline and diesel consumers, for several car categories in the Belgian market. We confront these data with the average mileages as predicted by the model; for example, the predicted average mileage by gasoline consumers of car j is numerically computed by R
. Standard errors and 95 percent con¯dence intervals are computed using a parametric bootstrap procedure. 2 3 The results are shown in Table 5 . For both gasoline and diesel consumers, the predicted mileages show a pattern in line with the actual mileages. For gasoline consumers, the mileages vary between 13000 km and 16000 km, depending on the weight category of the car; for diesel consumers they vary between 21000 km and 25000 km. In 10 of the 12 cases, the actual gasoline or diesel mileages fall within the 95 percent con¯dence interval associated with the predictions of the model (these cases are indicated by an asterix). These¯ndings are evidence that mileage heterogeneity is indeed a driving force in explaining the consumer gasoline/diesel demand. If other factors would also be signi¯cant, then one would expect signi¯cant underpredictions for gasoline mileages and overpredictions for the diesel mileages. Why is mileage heterogeneity in fact so important in the purchasing decision? We already provided institutional evidence in Section 2 that consumers are to a large extent guided by fuel cost savings in their choice of engine type. This is in part the result of succesful new product developments, leading to the supply of a range of closely comparable \twin" gasoline/diesel models. Furthermore, even if other characteristics, such as performance di®erences, play an important role, it is possible that the consumers' idiosyncratic valuations for these characteristics are correlated with their mileage.
Pricing
We next estimate the demand equation (7) and the pricing equation (10) jointly. A central question is whether the price di®erentials between gasoline and diesel cars are largely driven by cost di®erentials, or whether monopolistic price discrimination is important. To distinguish between the two alternative pricing models in (10), we considered nonnested hypothesis tests. More speci¯cally, as in Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995) we use the instrumental variable version of the P -test procedure proposed by McKinnon, White and 23 Speci¯cally, we assume that the estimated parameters are the true means and that the estimated variance covariance matrix of the parameters is the true variance covariance matrix. We then take 2000 random draws of the parameters assuming a multivariate normal distribution. Davidson (1983) in the context of instrumental variables. 24 The P -test statistic compares pairs of models and asymptotically has a standard normal distribution, if the null hypothesis is correct. The t-statistic for the validity of the monopolistic model against the alternative competitive model equals 0:328, well below the critical value (at a 95% con¯dence level) of 1:96. In contrast, the t-statistic for the validity of the competitive model against the monopolistic alternative is large, i.e. 6:672. These test statistics tell us that the model of monopolistic markup di®erences cannot be rejected in favor of the competitive model, while the reverse is clearly possible. Recall from section 4 that one should not conclude that all prices are necessarily set monopolistically in the automobile market. The results relate only to the pattern of price di®erentials between gasoline and diesel cars.
To gain a further understanding on the presence of monopolistic price discrimination, we also estimated the following equation: show the parameter estimates under joint estimation of the demand and pricing speci¯cations. All demand parameter estimates in the monopolistic speci¯cation (column 2) are comparable to the ones obtained from estimating the demand equation separately (column 1). This indicates that adding the monopolistic pricing speci¯cation does not seriously a®ect the demand side parameters. In contrast, several demand parameters change substantially under the competitive speci¯cation. This is for example true for the coe±cient on weight and several market and source¯xed e®ects. The most drastic change is the estimate of the annualization coe±cient ½, which doubles in size and has a very small standard error.
The cost side parameters are consistent with a priori expections in the monopolistic speci¯cation, but not always in the competitive speci¯cation. The technical characteristics positively and signi¯cantly affect marginal costs under the monopolistic speci¯cation; in the competitive speci¯cation, the sign of the horsepower parameter is negative (though insigni¯cant). The market¯xed e®ects show the most interesting di®erences. In the monopolistic speci¯cation, the¯xed e®ects for the French and Italian market (relative to Belgium) are insigni¯cant, which implies that there are no signi¯cant cost di®erences across markets. In contrast, in the competitive speci¯cation the market¯xed e®ects do enter signi¯cantly, with a signi¯cantly positive and large¯xed e®ect for France, and a signi¯cantly negative¯xed e®ect for Italy. This follows from the fact that the competitive speci¯cation imposes zero markup di®erences between gasoline and diesel cars;
any systematic cross-country di®erences in the price surcharge for diesel cars must then be attributed exclusively to cost di®erences. In the monopolistic speci¯cation, cross-country di®erences in the diesel surcharge may also be the result of markup di®erences. If one accepts the presumption that marginal cost di®erences between gasoline and diesel cars should not di®er signi¯cantly across markets, these¯ndings may be viewed as further economic evidence in favor of monopolistic price di®erences. Table 6 uses the results from the preferred monopolistic speci¯cation in Table 4 (column 2) to decompose the observed price di®erences between gasoline and diesel cars into cost and markup di®erences. In particular, for each make j, I compute the fraction of the price di®erence ¢p j that is explained by the di®erence in markup.
Explaining price di®erentials
The¯rst two columns of Table 6 present the average fraction across makes and the standard deviation over the sample. Since markups are a function of the parameter estimates, the fractions are themselves estimates.
To have an idea of the precision of this estimate, the third and fourth column show the estimated fraction for a representive make (i.e. with average characteristics) and its corresponding standard error. 25
The¯rst part of Table 6 considers all car makes in the sample. On average, the pricing model attributes about 84 percent of price di®erences to markup di®erences. The standard deviation is relatively large, 47 percent, which shows that for speci¯c cars the estimated fraction may be much lower or higher. For a representative make (with average characteristics) the fraction of the price di®erence that is explained by the markup di®erence is estimated fairly precisely at 61 percent.
The second part of Table 6 splits up the samples by country. This yields some interesting further insights.
Markup di®erences especially contribute to price di®erences in France, and less so in Belgium and in Italy.
This follows from the fact that France has the most favorable tax treatment of diesel cars (as discussed in detail in Section 2), thereby providing the strongest incentives for price discrimination. Notice that the greater importance of markup di®erences in France than elsewhere is also consistent with the estimates in Table 4 , which showed that cost di®erences between diesel and gasoline cars do not vary signi¯cantly across markets. In this case, then the larger diesel price premium in France than in Belgium and Italy (see Table   2 ) must naturally follow from higher diesel markups.
To further verify the plausibility of the results on the relative importance of cost versus markup di®er-ences, it would be instructive to have some prior information on cost di®erences. Unfortunately, no direct information was at our disposal. As an alternative, we collected data on the wholesale prices for a sample of 25 The standard error is obtained by¯rst linearizing the expression for the estimated markup fraction around the parameter estimates, and then applying the standard formula for computing the standard error of linear transformations of random variables.
gasoline and diesel engines, as charged to the dealers when old or broken engines need replacement. We compare the di®erences between the diesel and gasoline engine prices with the respective car price di®erences. 26
Engine price di®erentials may be a reasonable proxy for di®erences in the cost of producing gasoline and diesel cars, provided that the manufacturers do not also use the wholesale prices to price discriminate. Interestingly, we¯nd that the average engine price di®erential over the sample of car makes is $586, compared to a much larger average car price di®erential of $1567, even though the cars di®er in nothing else than the engine. 27 This con¯rms that the empirical results that price di®erentials are to a large extent driven by markup di®erentials.
Implications for tax incidence
Further insights in how consumers and manufacturers behave in response to taxes is obtained from computing various elasticities of demand with respect to tax changes. We consider the e®ects of both changes in fuel taxes and changes in annual car taxes on the market share of gasoline cars in the total sales of a make j. We concentrate on conditional e®ects, i.e. conditional on the consumers' choice of a given car make.
A more complete analysis of tax e®ects would also look at substitution towards di®erent car makes, or to other modes of transportation. Such an analysis would be very interesting for policy, yet it is beyond the scope of this paper. It would require a more detailed analysis of the market, with speci¯c assumptions on product di®erentiation between cars (on º j , e.g. speci¯ed as in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) ) and on competition between¯rms.
There are several ways to present the tax elasticities. For example, one may look at the separate demand e®ects of increasing the annual car tax for gasoline and for diesel cars. To summarize the information, we decided to \average" these e®ects: we focus on the e®ects of increasing the fuel and car tax di®erentials.
More speci¯cally, we compute the e®ect on the market share of gasoline cars in the total sales of make j, when the gasoline fuel tax is increased by 0.5 percent and the diesel car tax is reduced by 0.5 percent; and similarly for the gasoline and diesel car taxes. The computed elasticities per make j are:
The engine price data were collected directly from Belgian dealers in 2001, for the models in our original data set, or for their successors in case the models no longer were sold. For a consistent comparison, we also collected the corresponding car price data for this sample of models. 27 More precisely, for the sample of models in Belgium/2001 the average gasoline engine price was $4118, compared to an average diesel engine price of $4704. The average gasoline car price was $18581, versus an average diesel car price of $20149.
The car price data are of a comparable order of magnitude as the Belgian car price data during 1991-1994 (see Table 2 ), while the characteristics data were also comparable (average gasoline displacement of 1626cc versus average diesel displacement of 1928cc; average gasoline horsepower of 75.86kW versus average diesel horsepower of 67.89kW)
The term " F j reads as the elasticity of the demand for car j's gasoline powered variant with respect to the fuel tax di®erential; " C j is the elasticity of the demand for car j's gasoline powered variant with respect to the car tax di®erential.
We compute both partial and full tax elasticities. The partial tax elasticities are those one traditionally obtains from estimating demand equations, i.e. they account for the e®ects of taxes on demand, holding all other things constant. The full tax elasticities also take into account the additional demand e®ect stemming from the fact that¯rms may adjust their prices in response to a tax change, i.e. tax incidence. Our previous estimates favored a speci¯cation in which¯rms adjust their prices in response to taxes according to the monopolistic pricing condition (8), so we will use this to compute the full elasticities. 28 Yet we caution that this pricing condition is a stylized speci¯cation; in practice¯rms may take into account substitution towards towards competing products when adjusting prices. To the extent that this is the case, the partial elasticities may become more relevant.
Two further caveats are in order. First, since the empirical model assumed inelastic mileage demand, the estimated elasticities do not take into account changes in driving habits. Nevertheless, the empirical literature referred to in the introduction has obtained small elasticity estimates for mileage demand (conditional upon the car purchase), ranging between 0 and 0.2. Our results would thus essentially remain robust. Second, the model assumes that the product characteristics remain unchanged. In the long run,¯rms may invest in modifying their products in response to fuel price changes. Pakes et al. (1993) show that companies started to introduce new cars in the U.S. after the increased fuel prices in the 70s; the development of reliable diesel cars in Europe during the 70s and 80s has a similar interpretation. Yet note that the European countries currently set the fuel and car taxes in an uncoordinated way (unlike VAT); a national tax reform may therefore only have a modest impact on the product characteristics. Even if product characteristics would be modi¯ed in the long run, this would alter the level of the elasticities, yet our main conclusion that one should account for the mitigating e®ects of tax incidence (price responses) would remain. Table 7 presents the estimates. We focus the presentation on the estimated elasticity of a representative car (with average characteristics). The standard error is computed numerically using the same procedure described in the previous subsection. First, consider the estimated partial elasticities, ignoring tax incidence.
One can see that increasing the fuel tax di®erential has a much larger e®ect on demand than increasing the car tax di®erential (elasticity of -2.78 compared to -.597). This is because the annual car taxes are much lower in absolute value than the annual fuel costs (expenditure share of less than 25 percent), so a percentage increase in car taxes has a smaller e®ect on the consumer's budget constraint than a percentage increase in fuel costs. The high fuel tax elasticity is consistent with the high long-term fuel price elasticities obtained in the transportation and energy literature, as discussed in the introduction. Notice that Italy has much lower fuel and car tax elasticities for its representative car, as compared to the other two countries. This follows from the high market share of the representative gasoline car in Italy, caused by the disfavorable diesel tax treatment. Now consider the estimated full elasticities, which account for monopolistic tax incidence. Both the car tax and the fuel tax elasticity are now lower, because the manufacturers partly absorb an increase in the tax di®erential by lowering their price di®erential. Note that the fuel tax elasticities drop by more than the car tax elasticities. This illustrates that tax incidence is mainly based on the fuel taxes and less so on the car taxes, which is also consistent with the reduced form¯ndings in Table 3 .
The estimates of the elasticities have implications for tax policy. We illustrate this using two examples.
E®ectiveness of tax policy
In designing a public policy towards cars, the U.S. and Europe have followed a quite di®erent approach.
The U.S. have put most emphasis on direct regulation of the car purchasing decision. This has been implemented for example through fuel e±ciency standards (the CAFE standard), through purchasing mandates for°eet owners, and through mandated changes in auto and fuel availability. In Europe, car and fuel taxes have been used more commonly as an instrument to direct the demand towards a speci¯c type of cars. The di®erential gasoline and diesel tax policy is not the only example of this approach. Another example is the substantial tax discrimination between leaded and unleaded gasoline cars to promote the purchase of unleaded cars. In the near future, the introduction of electrical cars may again raise the tax question. At¯rst sight, our high estimates of the partial elasticities indicate that a tax policy can be a quite e®ective policy instrument. This is also suggested by the high long-term fuel price elasticities in the transportation/energy literature, and Borenstein's (1993) ¯nding for U.S. data on leaded and unleaded gasoline cars. However, our results on the full elasticities demonstrate that it is important to take into account the manufacturers' pricing responses when evaluating the e®ect of a change in taxes on demand. While the pricing responses may in practice not be as pronounced as implied by our monopolistic speci¯cation, the results suggest that the e®ectiveness of a tax policy may be reduced when tax incidence is taken into account.
Revenue implications of reducing tax discrimination
A central theme in the European policy debate is whether the current system of tax discrimination should be maintained. From an environmental point of view, there are several opponents against the tax discrimination because of the adverse e®ects of the diesel fuel (see Section 2). From a distributional point of view, speci¯c consumer interest groups have (unsuccessfully) taken action to reduce the discrimination in car taxes, based on constitutional arguments. Whatever the policy objectives behind the recent political pressure to reduce tax discrimination, one may ask what would be the budgetary implications for the governments.
If there were only one good to be taxed, this question would be easily addressed by looking at the tax elasticities: after a tax increase revenues would increase if and only if the elasticity (in absolute value) were less than one. In our application there are two goods, gasoline and diesel cars. In this case, one should also account for substitution e®ects. For example, an increase in the diesel car tax induces substitution towards gasoline cars, which has a positive e®ect on tax revenues, especially if the substituting consumers pay high gasoline taxes. A tax increase may thus increase revenues even if the elasticity is greater than one. Table 8 presents the revenue e®ects of various tax experiments for a representative car make, expressed in elasticity form. For example, to evaluate the revenue e®ects of the gasoline car tax, we compute (dR j =d¿ j G )=(¿ j G =(R j ), where R j is the total tax revenue (annual car tax plus fuel tax) on car make j.
As before, we look at conditional e®ects, i.e. taking the choice of the car as given.
29 First, consider the e®ects of raising the diesel taxes (the second and fourth columns of Table 8 ). In Belgium and France, the revenue e®ect of raising the diesel fuel taxes are quite substantial, with elasticities of respectively .62 and 1.00 without tax incidence; and elasticities of .44 and .61 under monopolistic tax incidence. The revenue e®ects of raising the diesel car taxes are smaller, but this follows from the relatively small revenue share of car taxes relative to fuel taxes (less than 25 percent). In Italy, the revenue e®ects of fuel and car taxes are much smaller than in Belgium or France, for two reasons: (i) the lower substitution e®ect found in Table 7 , and (ii) the lower extra amount of taxes paid by the consumers who substitute. Next, consider the revenue e®ects of raising gasoline taxes (the¯rst and third columns in Table 8 ). In Belgium and especially in France, a raise in the gasoline fuel tax would reduce tax revenues without tax incidence, but (moderately) increase tax revenues under monopolistic tax incidence. In Italy, the revenue e®ects of a raise in the gasoline fuel tax are positive and strong. The revenue e®ects of a raise in the gasoline car taxes are small in all countries because of the small share of car taxes in total revenue. Note that (monopolistic) tax incidence has a lower impact on the revenue e®ects than on the demand e®ects reported earlier.
To illustrate how to use these numbers in practice, consider a policy to reduce the fuel tax discrimination by raising the diesel fuel tax. As discussed, this policy has been advocated by many in the European policy debate, motivated by environmental and/or distributional considerations. Table 8 implies that such a policy would not contradict with government budgetary restrictions; it would rather soften the government's budget constraint. Especially in Belgium and in France the tax revenues would increase quite substantially. Put di®erently, the current favorable tax treatment on the diesel fuel in Europe is hard to defend on budgetary considerations. Since distributional or environmental goals would also favor an increase in the diesel fuel tax, other objectives, such as subsidization of the transportation sector, should explain the current tax system. 29 This restriction implies that the revenue e®ects depend on the tax amount paid by the indi®erent consumer, who substitutes after a tax change. In all three countries the indi®erent consumer of the representative car would pay higher taxes on the gasoline car than on the diesel car (an extra $282 in Belgium, $378 in France and $155 in Italy). The conditional revenue e®ects from raising the diesel taxes (fuel or car taxes) are therefore positive (since it induces revenue-raising substitution to gasoline cars), while the conditional revenue e®ects from raising gasoline taxes are ambiguous.
The existing tax policies towards gasoline and diesel cars in European countries provide a unique opportunity to analyze quality-based price discrimination and the implied tax incidence. We have developed an econometric framework of demand and pricing for gasoline and diesel cars. Consumers make a decision to buy a gasoline or a diesel car based on their annual mileage. Manufacturers set gasoline and diesel car prices with the possible aim of discriminating between consumers with a high willingnes to pay for savings in mileage costs, and those with a low willingness to pay.
Our empirical results showed that the relative pricing of gasoline and diesel cars is consistent with price discrimination of a monopolistic type, and inconsistent with competitive price di®erentials. On average, about 75 to 90 percent of the price di®erentials between gasoline and diesel cars can be explained by markup di®erences. The substantial degree of quality-based, second-degree price discrimination may seem surprising in a market with many car manufacturers. It adds to the well documented evidence of geographically oriented, third-degree price discrimination in the European car markets.
The implied tax incidence is especially based on fuel taxes and less so on annual car taxes. This result has implications for measuring the demand e®ects of increases in the fuel tax di®erentials between gasoline and diesel cars. If one accounts for the presence of monopolistic tax incidence, the estimated e®ectiveness of a change in fuel taxes drops. The revenue e®ects are also a®ected when tax incidence is accounted for, but to a lesser extent. ¤ Variables refer to absolute di®erences between the diesel and gasoline variables, except for sales, which refers to a percentage (comform with the model speci¯cation).
¤¤ The standard deviation is computed on the mean of the variables across time, say x j m , where j indexes the car make and m indexes the market. The standard deviation of x j m is decomposed into a between component (¹ x j ¡ ¹ x) and a within (x j m ¡ ¹ x j ) component. 
